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Abstract
We consider conditions that allow us to
find an optimal strategy for sequential de-
cisions from a given data situation. For the
case where all interventions are unconditional
(atomic), identifiability has been discussed
by Pearl & Robins (1995). We argue here
that an optimal strategy must be conditional,
i.e. take the information available at each de-
cision point into account. We show that the
identification of an optimal sequential deci-
sion strategy is more restrictive, in the sense
that conditional interventions might not al-
ways be identified when atomic interventions
are. We further demonstrate that a simple
graphical criterion for the identifiability of an
optimal strategy can be given.
1 INTRODUCTION
Consider the case of a chronically ill patient who
regularly sees their doctor in order to adjust their
treatment to the individual development of their dis-
ease. For example patients who receive anticoagula-
tion treatment are subject to regular blood testing;
depending on the outcome of such a test, and possibly
on earlier blood tests, the dosage of the anticoagulant
might be modified. An optimal strategy in this context
is a rule that stipulates, for each point in time where
an intervention is carried out, a dosage to be given so
as to optimise the treatment outcome, e.g. to keep the
coagulation measure stable within certain bounds. It
is intuitively obvious that to achieve optimality such
a rule will typically have to be a function of the indi-
vidual patient’s history, e.g. for a patient whose blood
coagulates too fast the dose has to be increased while
for a patient whose blood coagulates too slowly it has
to be decreased. Decision strategies where each inter-
vention is allowed to depend on the individual history
are called conditional, dynamic or adaptive treatment
strategies. A particular feature of such strategies is
that for a given patient it is not known what exact dose
they will receive at future interventions as this will de-
pend on their future coagulation test results which are
subject to random variation and influenced by many
factors other than treatment, such as diet and lifestyle.
Here we consider the question of what kind of data
situation will allow us to construct, i.e. identify, an
optimal decision strategy. This is particularly rele-
vant when data is obtained from observational stud-
ies, but also informs us about the design of exper-
imental studies. Essentially we need to be able to
identify all conditional strategies over which we want
to optimise. Identifiability of unconditional sequential
strategies (atomic interventions) has been considered
by Pearl & Robins (1995), where a graphical criterion
is given to read identifiability off a causal diagram.
Dawid & Didelez (2005) generalise their graphical cri-
terion to the case where some or all of the interventions
are allowed to depend on some or all of the observable
previous information. Our main result here is that if
all interventions are allowed to depend on all of the
observable previous information, as would be required
to find an optimal strategy, then the graphical check
simplifies considerably and we only need to check what
is called simple stability (Dawid & Didelez, 2005).
Motivated by the question of identifying conditional
(sequential) interventions, the identification of condi-
tional interventional distributions has been considered
(e.g. Pearl, 2000, section 4.2; Tian, 2004; Shpitser &
Pearl, 2006) within the context of causal diagrams
where all hidden variables are represented implicitly
using bidirected edges. In particular, Shpitser & Pearl
(2006) give necessary and sufficient criteria for this
identification problem. Our approach is slightly differ-
ent as we use influence diagrams, where the interven-
tions are made explicit by suitable decision nodes and
where unobservable variables are also explicitly shown
by individual nodes (Dawid, 2002).
We do not consider in this paper the actual estima-
tion and optimisation procedure required to find an
optimal strategy, which is a numerically demanding
task and a topic of its own. A regret–based approach
to this has been proposed by Murphy (2003), while
Robins (2004) suggests structural nested models (cf.
also discussion by Moodie et al. (2007)). An applica-
tion of the regret–based method to the anticoagulation
problem described above can be found in Rosthoj et
al. (2008).
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we in-
troduce the notation used throughout. Optimal strate-
gies are addressed in section 3. The general problem of
identifying possibly conditional strategies is covered in
section 4, where we present a simple sufficient criterion
called simple stability as well as a more general crite-
rion and explain how both can be checked graphically
using influence diagrams. The latter reduces to simple
stability when we consider optimal strategies as shown
in section 5. We discuss and compare our approach in
sections 6 and 7.
2 GENERAL SET–UP
Let A1, . . . , AN be variables that can be set by some
intervention (action variables), while L1, . . . , LN (each
of which can be vector valued) are additional obser-
vations / covariates, and let LN+1 ≡ Y be the out-
come of interest. To simplify exposition we restrict
ourselves to the case of all variables being discrete.
We assume that L≤i = (L1, . . . , Li) can be observed
before a decision about action Ai is made. We will
denote L = L≤N = (L1, . . . , LN) and similar for A.
A strategy s = (s1, . . . , sN ) consists of a set of func-
tions that assign to any partial history (a<i, l≤i) =
(a1, . . . , ai−1, l1, . . . , li) a value ai = si(a
<i, l≤i) in the
space of Ai, and by following strategy s we mean that
Ai are set to si(a
<i, l≤i) by some intervention for all
i = 1, . . . , N . Let S be the set of relevant strategies
(this set might be restricted e.g. due to feasibility). As
mentioned above, a strategy where si(a
<i, l≤i) ≡ si
does not actually depend on a<i, l≤i is called uncon-
ditional, as the actual values that the Ai’s are set to
do not depend on the observed history. Otherwise we
call the strategy conditional. More generally we might
also allow random (or stochastic) strategies, where
si(a
<i, l≤i) specifies a distribution over the space of
Ai meaning that the intervention consists of drawing
ai from this distribution and then setting Ai = ai by
an intervention. Our framework allows for such ran-
domised strategies (cf. Didelez et al. (2006) where this
is used in a similar context, focusing on direct effects).
3 OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
If the distribution p(y; s) of Y when following strategy
s is known, we can evaluate for any function k(·) the
expectation E{k(Y ); s}; typically k(·) would be a loss
function. This calculation can be implemented recur-
sively. Define
f(a≤j , l≤i) = E{k(Y )|a≤j , l≤i; s}
where j = i or j = i−1 and i = 1, . . . , N+11. We have
that f(a≤N , l≤N+1) = k(y) and f(∅) = E{k(Y ); s},
where starting with the former the latter can be ob-
tained by iteratively applying the following operations
for i = N + 1, . . . , 1
f(a<i, l≤i) =
∑
ai
p(ai|a
<i, l≤i; s)× f(a≤i, l≤i) (1)
(note that p(ai|a<i, l≤i; s) is by definition determined
by the strategy s and equal to the indicator function
I{ai = si(a<i, l≤i)} unless s is a randomised strategy)
and
f(a<i, l<i) =
∑
li
p(li|a
<i, l<i; s)× f(a<i, l≤i). (2)
This is exactly the procedure underlying the “exten-
sive form” analysis of sequential decision theory (see
e.g. Raiffa (1968)).
The optimal strategy sopt is given by optimising
E{k(Y ); s} = f(∅) over the set S; assuming that k(·)
is chosen such that large values are better, we have
sopt = argmax
S
E{k(Y ); s}.
The dynamic programming method to find an optimal
strategy essentially proceeds as follows: starting with
i = N+1 and working down to i = 1 find ai as function
of (a<i, l≤i) that maximises f(a≤i, l≤i). Hence, the
optimal strategy will typically be conditional on past
observations.
4 IDENTIFIABILITY
In practice we do not know the conditional distribu-
tions p(li|a<i, l<i; s), i = 1, . . . , N + 1 for all s ∈ S
required to evaluate (2). Identifiability addresses the
question whether data that have been gathered under
an observational regime (which might be a sequentially
randomised trial, or on observational study in the tra-
ditional meaning) can, in principle, inform us about
these conditional distributions. We first address the
1If the subscript or superscript of a set is not defined
then the set is defined to be ∅
question of identifiability of a single strategy s. It then
follows that the optimal strategy can be identified if
all strategies in S are identified so that the above op-
timisation can be carried out.
In order to formalise the question of identification we
introduce an indicator variable σ for the regime, where
σ = o denotes the observational regime, under which
the data is collected, and σ = s denotes the regime
under which strategy s is followed. In a sequentially
randomised study p(ai|a<i, l≤i; o) would typically be
known, whereas in a traditional observational study it
would be unknown but might be estimable from data.
Identifiability: A strategy s is identified if we can ob-
tain E{k(Y ); s} uniquely from the joint distribution of
(A,L, Y ) under σ = o.
Conditions for identifiability require a positivity con-
dition, such that actions that arise from the strategy
ai = si(a
<i, l≤i) actually have a positive probability
to occur under σ = o if the history (a<i, l≤i) has a
positive probability to occur under σ = s (for a more
formal definition of positivity see Dawid & Didelez
(2005)); here, we will take positivity for granted.
4.1 SIMPLE STABILITY
It can easily be seen from (2) that a sufficient condition
for identifiability of s is that the following conditional
distributions are the same under both regimes
p(li|a
<i, l<i; s) = p(li|a
<i, l<i; o),
i = 1, . . . , N + 1, whenever the conditioning event
has positive probability under both regimes (Dawid
& Didelez, 2005). This is called simple stability and
also symbolised by
Li⊥⊥σ|(A
<i,L<i), i = 1, . . . , N + 1 (3)
where σ takes values in {o, s}. Simple stability is
closely related to the no unmeasured confounders as-
sumption (Robins, 1997). Note that the above no-
tation for conditional independence (Dawid, 1979)
has been generalised for problems involving deci-
sion variables by Dawid (2002), and can be checked
graphically2 on appropriate influence diagrams as
shown in Figure 1, for example.
4.2 G–RECURSION
With simple stability, the target E{k(Y ); s) = f(∅}
can now be obtained by iterating (1) and (2) starting
2using the moralisation criterion (cf. Cowell et al., 1999)
or, equivalently, d–separation (Verma & Pearl, 1990)
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Figure 1: Example for simple stability.
with i = N + 1, where in (1) p(ai|a
<i, l≤i; s) is known
by definition of the strategy s and (2) can be modified
to
f(a<i, l<i) =
∑
li
p(li|a
<i, l<i; o)× f(a<i, l≤i).
due to simple stability. The name G–recursion has
been coined by Robins (1986).
4.3 EXTENDED STABILITY
It will typically be difficult to believe in simple stabil-
ity (3) without additional considerations. We might
want to proceed by constructing a more complex but
more acceptable model, typically including additional
not necessarily observable variables, and investigate
whether or not we can deduce the desired simple sta-
bility property. We denote the set of additional vari-
ables by U. Extended stability then holds if this set
can be partitioned into (U1, . . . , UN) (each Ui can be
vector valued or the empty set) such that U<i are not
affected by an intervention in Ai, i = 1, . . . , N , and
(Li, Ui)⊥⊥σ|(A
<i,L<i,U<i), i = 1, . . . , N + 1, (4)
Clearly (4) implies that strategy s could be identified
if U was observed as it is then just the same as simple
stability w.r.t. (A,L,U, Y ).
In many problems an extended stability assumption
might be regarded as more reasonable and defensi-
ble than simple stability, so long as appropriate un-
observed variables U are taken into account. For ex-
ample, this might be the case if we believed that under
σ = o the actions Ai were taken by a decision-maker
who had access to variables in the set U as well as L.
Extended stability does not in general allow G–
recursion if U is unobserved. However, it may do
so if we can assume an (in)dependence structure on
(A,L,U, Y ) and σ that allows us to deduce that sim-
ple stability (3) does hold. Dawid & Didelez (2005)
give some further conditions for this and show how
these can be verified graphically. As an example con-
sider the graphs in Figure 2, where extended stability
holds (here L1 = ∅). In graph (a) simple stability is
violated as L2⊥⊥/ σ|A1. In graph (b) the only change is
that U1 = L1 can now be observed and then simple sta-
bility holds as L1⊥⊥σ, L2⊥⊥σ|A1, L1 and Y⊥⊥σ|A,L.
Y
L2
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U1 U2
Y
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Examples for extended stability; in (a) sim-
ple stability is violated while in (b) it holds.
4.4 GENERAL CONDITIONS
A strategy s can be identified under weaker conditions
than simple stability. This has been demonstrated by
Pearl & Robins (1995) for the case of unconditional
strategies. Next we extend the result to conditional
(possibly stochastic) strategies.
We assume extended stability with respect to
(A,L,U, Y ) and definejoint distributions pi(·) as
pi(A,L,U, Y ) = p(A
≤i,L≤i,U≤i; o)
×p(A>i,L>i,U>i, Y |A≤i,L≤i,U≤i; s)
Hence p0(·) = p(·; s) is the joint distribution under
the strategy s, while pN (·) = p(·; o) is the joint distri-
bution under the observational regime, where we ex-
ploit extended stability to obtain p(Y |A,L,U; s) =
p(Y |A,L,U; o).
Theorem 1. Under extended stability, the strategy s
is identified by G–recursion if
pi−1(y|a
≤i, l≤i) = pi(y|a
≤i, l≤i), i = 1, . . . , N. (5)
Proof: see appendix, and Dawid & Didelez (2005).
Property (5) can be paraphrased as the distribution
of Y given a≤i, l≤i having to be the same regardless
of whether ai has arisen out of the strategy s or from
observation o, when we know that future actions will
follow the strategy s.
A graphical check for (5) is more involved than for
simple stability as it has to reflect the particular con-
struction of the distributions pi. This will be addressed
in the next section.
4.5 GRAPHICAL CHECKS
If we express our subject matter background knowl-
edge about the conditional independence structure
among (A,L,U, Y ) and the way we can intervene in
A graphically we can check the above conditions for
identifiability by simple graphical checks. Two ap-
proaches are possible. Firstly, we can augment the
graph with the intervention indicator σ as advocated
in Pearl (1993), Lauritzen (2001), Dawid (2002); this
augmented graph (influence diagram) will be denoted
by D. Simple stability (3) wrt. observables (A,L, Y )
can, for example, be checked on such influence dia-
grams as in Figures 1 and 2. Secondly, and as is com-
mon in much of the mainstream causal literature, we
can take the interventions in A as implicit and formu-
late graphical conditions involving (A,L,U, Y ) only,
omitting σ. We denote the graph which implicitly as-
sumes extended stability with respect to sequential in-
terventions in A by D′ (this is also called a causal
graph with respect to A (Pearl, 2000). The graphs D
andD′ only differ in that the former has the additional
decision node σ with arrows into A. It is easy to see
that simple stability can therefore be checked on D′
by assessing whether L<i satisfies the back–door cri-
terion relative to (A<i, Li) (Pearl, 1995). This implies
that the causal effects of each Ai on later covariates
Lj, j > i, are identified.
For the graphical check of (5) we first define the dif-
ferent parent sets for the actions Ai under different
regimes. Let pao(Ai) be the parent nodes (excluding
σ) of Ai in D when σ = o and let pas(Ai) be the
parent nodes (excluding σ) of Ai in D when σ = s,
i.e. if si(a
<i, l≤i) is constant in some of its arguments
then these are not in pas(Ai). The two parent sets
are not the same, as under σ = o Ai may depend on
some variables inU≤i, while under a strategy s we can
obviously only take observable variables into account
when choosing an action.
Now, we construct augmented graphs Di such that
the only arrow out of the node σ is into Ai, and such
that the graph parents of the action variable Aj are
given by pao(Aj) for j < i and pas(Aj) for j > i
while the parent set for Ai is the union of the parents
under both regimes and σ. Such a graph represents
the factorisation of the distribution pi constructed in
section 4.4 if Ai arises under σ = o and of pi−1 if Ai
is generated according to σ = s. Let [·⊥⊥ · |·]Di denote
graph separation in Di then we have that (5) holds if
[Y⊥⊥σ|A≤i,L≤i]Di (6)
This procedure is illustrated in Figure 3 for the ex-
ample of graph (a) from Figure 2 assuming an uncon-
ditional intervention in A2, i.e. pas(A2) = ∅. Hence
there are no arrows into A2 in D1. We can easily
see that [Y⊥⊥σ|A1]D1 and [Y⊥⊥σ|A1, A2, L2]D2 show-
ing that a strategy where A2 is chosen without taking
YL2
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(b)(a)
Figure 3: Same example as in Figure 2(a); here (a)
shows D1 and (b) shows D2 with uncond. intervention
in A2.
past covariates into account is identifiable even though
simple stability as investigated in Figure 2 is violated.
In contrast, in the same example if we assume that the
intervention s2 in A2 does depend on previous covari-
ates, i.e. pas(A2) = (A1, L2) then we have to modify D1
as shown in Figure 4. Now we find that [Y⊥⊥σ|A1]D1
is violated and we cannot guarantee that such a con-
ditional strategy is identifiable.
Y
L2
A1 A2
U1 U2
Figure 4: Same example as in Figure 3(a), D1 with
conditional intervention in A2.
Pearl & Robins (1995) show that based on a causal di-
agram D′ (that does not include a node σ) and for un-
conditional sequential interventions sufficient graphi-
cal conditions are given by
[Y⊥⊥Ai|A
<i,L≤i]D′
i
, (7)
where D′i is the graph D
′ with all edges out of Ai
and all edges into A>i removed. Comparing this with
our procedure we can see that the idea is the same:
deleting the edges out of Ai corresponds to retaining
only the back–door paths from Ai as it is only these
that are relevant when checking (6) due to σ having
only an arrow into Ai. Further, deleting every edge
into Ai+1, . . . , AN corresponds to changing the parent
sets of these variables to only include the parents under
s. Note that if the interventions are unconditional then
Aj has no parents among A
<j ,L≤j ,U≤j under σ = s.
Hence, an immediate extension of Pearl & Robins’ ap-
proach, that has also been suggested by Robins (1997),
to the case of conditional interventions is given by
modifying the meaning of D′i in (7) so that only edges
into Aj , j = i + 1, . . . , N , are deleted that the inter-
vention sj does not depend on. This will always be
the case for all edges from U≤j into Aj because the
intervention can obviously not be a function of unob-
served quantities. This is illustrated in Figure 5 for
the same example as above with a conditional inter-
vention at A2. We can see that [Y⊥⊥A1]D′
1
is violated
while [Y⊥⊥A2|A1, L2]D′
2
holds.
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(b)(a)
Figure 5: Pearl & Robins’ check when s2 is conditional,
(a) D′1 and (b) D
′
2
5 IDENTIFIABILITY OF OPTIMAL
STRATEGIES
As argued in section 3, the optimal strategy will typ-
ically be a conditional strategy, i.e. a strategy that
must allow action ai = si(a
<i, l≤i) to depend on all of
(a<i, l≤i) (notice that dependence on a<i is only rele-
vant for random strategies as otherwise aj is a function
of l≤j , j = 1, . . . , i − 1 anyway). We show now that
in this case the more general conditions of section 4.4
reduce to simple stability.
First we need some regularity assumptions.
Assumption 1. We assume pas(Ai) ⊂pao(Ai) for all
i = 1, . . . , N .
The assumption means that the parents of Ai when
we follow the strategy s are a subset of its par-
ents under the observational regime. This can eas-
ily be satisfied by redefining, if necessary, pao(Ai) as
pao(Ai)∪pas(Ai), with any added parents having no
effect on the conditional probabilities for Ai under o.
Note that adding edges from observable nodes into ac-
tion nodes cannot destroy identifiability.
Assumption 2. Each L1, . . . , LN is an ancestor of Y
in the graph D0, where the parents of Ai are as under
strategy s, i = 1, . . . , N .
This means that the covariates predict Y when we fol-
low the strategy s.
Remark. Assumption 2 is implied if
(i) each A1, . . . , AN is an ancestor of Y in D0, and
(ii) each L1, . . . , LN is an ancestor of some Aj in D0.
As we want to investigate whether the actions affect
Y , part (i) will be plausible because otherwise we have
at least one action of which we know a priori that it
does not predict Y and this would not typically be in-
cluded in the investigation. Part (ii) is relevant in the
context of optimal strategies as these must in princi-
ple be allowed to depend on all previous observable
covariates.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Then if the graphical check of (5) succeeds, the prob-
lem exibits simple stability with respect to (A,L, Y ).
Proof: see appendix.
In consequence we can say that if the target is to find
an optimal strategy and we are asking whether this is
possible from a given data situation we do not need to
apply the more complex graphical check of (5) but can
just check simple stability, which has the advantage
that it can be seen from a single graph like e.g. Figure
2(b). This also implies that a sufficient criterion for
identification of an optimal strategy is that the causal
effects of each Ai on later covariates Lj, j > i, can be
identified by the back–door criterion as mentioned in
section 4.5.
6 RELATION TO OTHER
APPROACHES
It has been argued that conditional strategies can be
identified if conditional intervention distributions can
be identified (Pearl, 2000, section 4.2). For the case
of a non–stochastic conditional strategy s that fixes
a = s(l) this is seen as follows. We have that
p(y; s) =
∑
l
p(y|l; s)p(l; s) (8)
(the recursive version of which is based on (2)). As l
in p(y|l; s) is given, we have p(y|l; s) = p(y|l;a), where
σ = a denotes an unconditional strategy and a = s(l).
Hence we can identify p(y; s) if we can identify p(y|l;a)
for every sequence l and every unconditional strategy
σ = a. Shpitser & Pearl (2006) give a sound and com-
plete algorithm to identify such conditional interven-
tion distributions, like p(y|l;a), which outputs FAIL
iff the problem is not identified. This takes a semi–
Markovian graph as input which is based on a causal
model.
However, for the whole p(y; s) to be identifiable by (8)
we also need p(l; s) to be identifiable, where it is im-
portant to note that due to the sequential nature of
the problem some covariates will be affected by earlier
actions and hence we cannot assume p(l; s) = p(l; o).
Tian (2004) gives an example where p(y|l; s) is identi-
fied while p(l; s) is not. Hence, identifiability of condi-
tional sequential plans is not covered by the identifia-
bility of conditional interventional distributions alone.
Our results do not provide a necessary criterion for
identifiability. However, they do not require a semi–
Markovian graph nor a causal model (which in our
case would assume that we can intervene in any of
L1, . . . , LN as well as in A) as long as the background
knowledge can be encoded in a DAG on (A,L,U, Y, σ).
More importantly, as mentioned earlier, simple stabil-
ity implies that the effect of each action on later co-
variates p(l; s) as well as the conditional intervention
distribution p(y|l; s) are identifiable, so that (8) ap-
plies.
7 DISCUSSION
We have addressed the question of identifying optimal
sequential strategies within the framework of decision
theory. Simple stability (3) provides a straightforward
graphical check for identifiability on a single influence
diagram, and the more involved check for the condi-
tions in section 4.4 that extends Pearl & Robins (1995)
approach is in fact not more general.
We would like to point out that even though the tar-
get of inference E(k(Y ); s) can be constructed using
the G–recursion, it is in practice not advisable to es-
timate an optimal strategy (when it is identified) by
estimating the individual factors of the G–recursion
formula (Robins & Wasserman, 1997). This has mo-
tivated the alternative approaches such as suggested
by Murphy (2003) and Robins (2004). The reasoning
regarding identifiability, however, remains valid.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
This is a special case of a more general result (Dawid
and Didelez, 2005, § 7.1). The following argument is
specialised to the current context, and assumes that
events conditioned on have positive probability.
Similar to section 3, define
f(a≤i, l≤i) = Ei{k(Y ) | a≤i, l≤i}
f(a<i, l≤i) = Ei−1{k(Y ) | a<i, l≤i},
where Ei denotes expectation under distribution
pi. In particular, f(∅) = E{k(Y )|s}, which is
what we wish to compute; while f(a≤N , l≤N) =
E{k(Y )|a≤N , l≤N ; o} is estimable from the observa-
tional data.
By extended stability, the distribution of (Li, Ui) given
(A<i,L<i,U<i) is the same under both the observa-
tional regime o and the strategy s. It then follows
from the definition of pi−1 that the joint distribution of
(A<i,L≤i,U≤i) is the same under pi−1 as in o, whence
in particular pi−1(li|a<i, l<i) = p(li|a<i, l<i; o). Thus,
f(a<i, l<i) =
∑
li
pi−1(li|a<i, l<i)× Ei−1{k(Y ) | a<i, l≤i}
=
∑
li
p(li|a<i, l<i; o)× f(a<i, l≤i). (9)
Also, from the construction of pi−1, the fact that
p(ai|a
<i, l≤i; s) is fully determined independently of
u≤i, and (5), f(a<i, l≤i) =
∑
ai
pi−1(ai | a<i, l≤i)× Ei−1{k(Y ) | a≤i, l≤i}
=
∑
ai
p(ai | a<i, l≤i; s)× f(a≤i, l≤i), (10)
where Ei−1{k(Y )|a≤i, l≤i} = f(a≤i, l≤i) due to (5).
Together, (9) and (10) show that f can be com-
puted by G-recursion: starting with f(a≤N , l≤N) =
E{k(Y ) | a≤N , l≤N ; o}, we will exit the recursion with
f(∅) = E{k(Y ) | s}.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We introduce the following abbreviations for certain
graph-separation properties:
γi : [Y⊥⊥σ|(L
≤i,A≤i)]Di
αij : [Lj+1⊥⊥i σ|(L
≤i,A≤i)]Di
αk : αij holds for all 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ k
βk : [Lk+1⊥⊥σ|(A
≤k,L≤k)]D
Hk : αk ⇒ βk
Also, we use mani(A,B,C) to denote the moralised
subgraph of Di on the set An(A ∪B ∪ C)3.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then
for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ N , γi ⇒ αij .
Proof: Fix i, and suppose that for some j ≥ i, αij
fails. Then there is a path pi1 in mani(A
≤i,L≤i, Lj+1)
joining σ to some L ∈ Lj+1 avoiding (A≤i,L≤i). Since
by Assumption 2 we have Lj+1 is an ancestor of Y
in Di, pi1 is a path in mani(A
≤i,L≤i, Y ) with the
same property. But again by Assumption 2, there is
a descending path pi2 in Di joining L to Y avoiding
(A≤i,L≤i) since these are non–descendants of Lj+1.
Hence, the concatenation of pi1 and pi2 is a path in
mani(A
≤i,L≤i, Y ) joining σ and Y while avoiding
(A≤i,L≤i) showing that γi fails.
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then Hk
holds, for all 0 ≤ k ≤ N .
Proof: The proof is by induction on k. H0 holds
since β0 holds by extended stability. Now fix k ≤ N
and suppose that Hl holds for all 0 ≤ l < k and argue
that Hk holds. To do so we assume that αk holds, and
argue that βk follows.
Since for all 0 ≤ l < k αl must hold, from Hl so must
βl.
Before proceeding we introduce some notation. For
1 ≤ j ≤ k, we denote by Mj (resp. Nj) the moralised
ancestral graph of (A≤j ,L≤j , Lk+1) inD (resp. inDj).
We write V1 ↘ V2 to denote that there is a descending
directed path in D from node V1 to node V2 whose
3We use the moralisation criterion here to verify graph
separation in DAGs
intermediate nodes are all in U.
Now suppose βk fails, then there exists a path pi inMk
having the following property:
P: pi connects σ to Lk+1, all intermediate nodes being
in U.
Let Πj denote the property that any moral link in pi
is due to a common child in C in (A≤j ,L≤j).
If pi contains a moral link due to a common child
C /∈ (A≤k,L≤k) then C ∈ U, and we can modify
pi by adding the intermediate node C and removing
the initial moral link, while still satisfying property P.
Proceeding in this way for all such moral links we see
that we can suppose that Πk holds.
Let U1 ∈ U be the first internal node in pi after σ:
this must exist because Lk+1 and σ are not directly
connected, nor can they have a common child in Mk.
The link σ—U1 can only be a moral link due to a com-
mon child Ai for some i ≤ k. Then we cannot have
U1 ↘ Lk+1 since this would create a path violating
αik.
Let U2 be the first internal node, if one exists, in pi that
is not an ancestor of (A≤k,L≤k) in D. Then we must
have U2 ↘ Lk+1 by some path pi2, say. In particular
U1 6= U2. Denote by pi1 the section of pi between σ
and U2, and let pi
o
1 be this section stripped of its end-
points. Since U1 ∈ pio1 , it is not empty. Now replace
the original section section of pi from U2 to Lk+1 by
pi2. The new path will still possess properties P and
Πk. We replace pi by the concatenation of pi1 and pi2
which will be renamed pi for the sequel.
Consider now the hypotheses (Qj), 0 ≤ j ≤ k, defined
by Qj : pi
o
1 ⊂an(A
≤j,L≤j) and property Πj holds. We
shall show that Qj ⇒ Qj−1.
Thus suppose Qj . There cannot exist U ∈ pio1 with
U ↘ Aj since this would violate αjk. We deduce that
pio1 ⊂an(A
≤j,L≤j) and any moral link in pi must be
due to a common child in (A<j ,L≤j).
Now Qj implies that pi is a path in Mj. Then there
cannot exist U ∈ pio1 with U ↘ Lj since this would
violate βj−1. We deduce Qj−1.
Now Qk holds by construction. Applying the above
repeatedly we deduce Q0, which can only hold if pi
o
1 is
empty. But U1 ∈ pio1 . This contradiction proves that
βk holds and so we have demonstrated Hk. The de-
sired result follows by induction.
Proof of Theorem 2: The graphical check succeeds
just when we can show γi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . By the above
Lemmas, αN must hold which implies that βj , 1 ≤
j ≤ N does. This is exactly the condition for simple
stability.
